Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. The U.S. public has come to expect that its troops will rapidly return home following decisive military victories in foreign lands. In Iraq, however, U.S. troops have not been able to rapidly return home. On the contrary, the U.S. has more troops deployed to Iraq now, during the stability operations phase, than it did during the major combat operations phase. Furthermore, although U.S. forces suffered approximately 150 deaths during the initial weeks of major combat operations, they lost almost seven times that number during the first year and a half of postwar stability operations. The unanticipated number of troops lost during stability operations indicates that a combat phase is missing. A new combat phase must be incorporated to address stability operations in order to both reduce U.S. casualties, and inform civilian and military personnel of the length and intricacies involved in reaching stability.
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THE MISSING PHASE: THE NEED FOR A NEW STABILITY PHASE IN MODERN COMBAT OPERATIONS
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. suffered approximately 150 deaths during the initial weeks of major combat operations. The nation has since lost at least seven times that many troops during the postwar stability operations in that country. The U.S. currently has more troops deployed to Iraq during the stability operations phase than it did during the major combat operations phase. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the commander of all land forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), recognized the crux of the problem: "A lack of effective coordination among military forces (that toppled Saddam Hussein) and civilian agencies sent to rebuild Iraq slowed initial efforts to bring stability to the country…" 1 Moreover, he pointed out, prewar planning and coordination with other government agencies had been inadequate and did not allow U.S. troops to properly conduct stability operations. When McKiernan's replacement, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, assumed command of coalition forces in 2003, his mission was to defeat an insurgency just beginning to take on momentum and to establish a secure and stable Iraq. When Sanchez relinquished command a year later, that country, in one observer's description, "was all but coming apart at the seams." 2 In short, as the two commanders discovered, the longer it takes to stabilize a country, the longer the insurgents have to gain local support.
In past conflicts, the U.S. has inadequately planned post conflict and stability operations.
Following Operation Just Cause in Panama, General Maxwell Thurman admitted that he did not pay attention to the post-conflict planning effort because he was too concerned with fighting the battle: "I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic [the post-conflict plan]…" 3 As recently
as Operation Desert Storm , the post conflict planning faced significant obstacles. The commander responsible for that phase of operations was unable to obtain any useful staff support to plan for post-conflict issues. 4 The pattern did not significantly change for OIF. American way of war, Antulio Echevarria notes in this regard, "tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military triumphs, whether on the scale of major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes." 5 Iraq has shown that the United
States can no longer afford to indulge this tendency. The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that current military doctrine and governmental processes are inadequate for stability operations in the modern era and that a new combat phase and new interagency procedures are essential to the success of such operations. Ideally, stability just happens as a result of military success. In this phase, Joint Doctrine suggests that the joint force commander now has time to "focus on synchronizing and integrating joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion" thus achieving a "self-sustaining peace and the establishment of the rule of law." 8 By assuming the transition enemies who refuse to quit precisely because they cannot be decisively defeated."3 irregular enemies the U.S. is facing in Iraq did not quit because their government was replaced following major combat operations. They continued to organize their forces to destroy the stability operations, while the U.S. and its coalition partners tried to figure out how to combat an unexpected insurgent threat. 
CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY GUIDANCE AND PROCEDURES
ANALYSIS
The Christian Science Monitor accurately described the results of the four-phased campaign for OIF: "In Iraq, shock and awe from the air allowed for US ground troops' quick dash to Baghdad. But it also sent most of Saddam Hussein's loyalist forces underground, thereby setting the scene for an insurgency that continues to seriously undermine efforts at reconstruction." 18 The fact is that no combination of CENTCOM's war plan and guidance provided by the NMS and Joint Doctrine is adequate to plan and execute stability operations if an insurgency occurs. The brutal combat characteristics of this phase and the force required to successfully mount stability operations are simply not sufficiently addressed.
Prior to the war, some military leaders recognized these deficiencies, arguing that while a small coalition force moving rapidly and supported by adequate firepower might well defeat the Iraqi army, a larger force would still be necessary for the ensuing stability operations. 19 The objective of providing security and stability in Iraq, in other words, was going to be more difficult reporting to the State Department, the CPA reported to the President through the DoD. The rationale was based on lessons learned from Bosnia. In Bosnia a dual reporting and command structure existed: The United Nations was in charge of civil reconstruction, yet the U.N. did not report to the same authorities to which the military chain-of-command reported. 23 As a consequence, the dual reporting and command structure did not allow for unity of effort and caused confusion concerning who was in charge. In Iraq, however, the situation was different.
The U.S. should have had unity of effort since it was in charge of both the civil reconstruction The ways (concepts) include planning and conducting stability operations in a combat phase, not a "postwar" operations phase. The concept that stability operations would take place in a combat environment was not expected in Iraq. The situation in that country is an example of the reluctance of U.S. civilian and military leaders to consider the establishment of political and economic order (establishing security) as a part of war itself. 26 Prewar planning for this additional phase should emphasize insurgent operations, threat of terrorism, border security, ammunition accountability, training security and defense forces, and securing U.S. national objectives before transitioning to a postwar phase. If CENTCOM planners had had these considerations in mind, the "Shock and Awe" air and ground campaign might have been planned differently. Planners concerned with a combat stability enforcement phase might have focused on more fully defeating the enemy and not so much on speed in achieving a quick military objective. This is more than just an academic point. The combat linkage of a stability enforcement phase to a decisive operations phase can become pivotal to effective reconstruction strategies in future wars with important implications not just for military planning and command arrangements, but for the implementation of governance operations as well.
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Obtaining resources [means] for the post-conflict plan tends to be the final and most difficult step in the planning process. 28 The ability to obtain the resources for this new phase should be the critical factor when deciding whether the U.S. has the ability to conduct military actions in the future. This new phase will likely require more forces than those for the major combat operations phase. In Iraq, the primary coalition question should have been whether there were enough forces to secure the country, not to defeat Saddam and his army. Prior to the beginning of the war, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army both called for significantly more troops for the stability and security phase. 29 Having this new phase written in Joint Doctrine and thus a major part of the campaign plan would have given their argument more weight.
A new "combat" phase in Joint Doctrine will demand the same level of attention and priority that the first three phases receive. This is a suitable alternative to the four-phase model and should have a positive impact on the way stability and security operations are conducted. It will help commanders maintain the initiative and focus on winning the war before making the transition to postwar operations. In Iraq, the postwar stability operations phase concentrated on defending against insurgent attacks for well over a year. Not until commanders began offensive combat operations to reclaim cities and towns did the U.S. and Iraqi forces begin to reclaim the initiative in the war. This delay allowed the insurgents and terrorist to organize and gather supplies to fight an effective guerrilla warfare campaign.
Even though the new phase may require more forces than the major combat operations phase, it is feasible for the current force structure to support it. This is true because adding more forces to conduct offensive stability enforcement should result in more rapidly gaining a secure and stable environment. The U.S. strategy "should include the rapid stabilization of the state or area using the appropriately sized force (but larger is usually better); 33 And yet planning for a major combat enforcement stability phase implies the potential for a protracted campaign even before the commencement of hostilities.
The picture, however, is not so grim. To begin with, the new phase will provide more complete and realistic information on which policy makers can gauge whether to pursue policies concerning the use of force. Much of this more complete information will come from the U.S.
military, compelled by the requirements of the new phase to focus more thoroughly on resources and concepts for combat stability operations. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has acknowledged the need for this focus in his recent guidance which requires combatant commanders to devote more resources and attention to post hostility planning in their war plans. 34 At the same time, the arguments that form the basis for the feasibility of the new phase can also apply in gaining public and congressional acceptance. Simply put, the more forces used in the new phase, the more rapid the stability and security achieved in the environment, and thus the less protracted the requirement for military forces during the establishment of civil control and rule of law in the transition phase.
At the operational level, the risk of adding the phase is that it will add complexity to the overall campaign plan. This is true. But the small amount of added complexity should reduce the ambiguity associated with the current stabilization efforts taking place in the so-called "postwar"
phase. The traditional four-phased model clearly does not adequately address considerations for successful stability operations-a development that should not continue. "Given today's realities," one analyst points out, "failure to prepare adequately for present and future politicalinsurgency war contingencies is unconscionable." 35 The U.S. tendency has been to prepare inadequately for insurgency warfare. The five-phase model addresses the critical issues that will help the U.S. and coalition partners of the future prepare more effectively to conduct this type of operations.
NEW INTERAGENCY PLANNING AND ACTIONS
Military planning using the new phase will benefit from interagency involvement from start to finish. The successful campaign will have an organization that aggregates military and non-military agencies into one unified command able to adapt and utilize resources efficiently. phase that combines combat and stability operations will only accentuate the need to include interagency involvement throughout the entire planning process to ensure a holistic effort from start to finish. 39 The ways (concepts) are to create an integrated team from the appropriate agencies to plan and execute operations in the future. Since interagency planning and coordination with the military in Iraq was lacking for the first three phases of the campaign, the plans for the war and postwar periods were largely developed separately. 40 Secretary Rumsfeld noted that this was a problem and has taken the initiative to correct this problem with a new directive to the combatant commanders. Inherent in this directive is the idea that commanders will plan the high-intensity part of the war differently if they are also thinking about how to stabilize the country after the major fight is over. 41 This idea will be further enhanced with the creation of a new phase that combines combat and stability operations. Moreover, the fact that combat commanders will remain in command during stability operations will provide a consistent and unambiguous focus for interagency participation until the Department of State assumes control in the fifth and final phase.
The means (resources) for the interagency to be involved in all phases of future operations already exist in the sense that all necessary agencies are already in existence.
However, the rest of the organizations that make up the interagency are not manned or financed to the level of the DoD. These inequities must be addressed for the interagency process to All this is in keeping with the fundamental philosophy of PDD 56 that "military and civilian agencies should operate in a synchronized manner through effective interagency management and the use of special mechanisms to coordinate agency efforts. Integrated planning and effective management of agency operations early on in an operation can avoid delays, reduce pressure on the military to expand its involvement in unplanned ways, and create unity of effort within an operation that is essential for success of the mission." 43 As was the case with Joint Doctrine, the acceptability of interagency involvement in the planning process of future military operations is a real challenge. The military is known for keeping plans under tight security. Trust of other government agencies will have to be built for this option to be effective. Both the military and the interagency are known for conducting operations in isolation from one another, within "stovepipes", according to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace. 44 These stovepipes must be eliminated to achieve unify of effort throughout the planning process. To break into the military planning process as more than a superficial review, the interagency must be given a real voice that includes the ability to raise concerns about military plans to the appropriate levels of government.
The risk of adverse consequences from interagency involvement in military campaign planning using the new five-phase campaign planning process is real. Leaks to the press or mistakes attributed to the interagency that result in less effective military operations would be hard to overcome. The risk that a lack of trust between agencies of the federal government and the military may develop or increase is also a concern and must be acknowledged. However, since planning and coordination to use all aspects of national power (military and the interagency) is essential to win future wars against holistic threats, this risk must be taken.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study does not suggest that stability and security operations in Iraq would have been easy if that operation had contained a combat stability enforcement phase and if the interagency had been involved throughout the planning and execution of all of the phases of the campaign.
"Yes, the Pentagon botched the planning for the Iraq occupation," one national-security specialist observed, "but no amount of good planning could have surmounted the herculean task of remaking an entire society from the ground up, especially a fractious one like Iraq with no experience with democracy." 45 But this study does conclude that adding a new phase to Joint Doctrine and ensuring interagency involvement in planning and executing all phases of future military campaigns will be the more effective way to plan and execute such operations for the foreseeable future.
At the end of World War II, the German and Japanese militaries were thoroughly defeated; their will to fight had been eliminated and their means to do so, in any case, was completely diminished after years of war. 46 This was not the case when Baghdad fell. Many in Iraq did not lose their will to fight after just weeks of war. Many, who knew they could not face the U.S. and coalition forces head on, retained the means and desire to fight an insurgent war after the U.S. and coalition forces concluded major combat operations. The U.S. did not anticipate the large number of insurgents or their ability to wage an unconventional war. Adding a new combat phase is a way to minimize the effects of unanticipated problems following major combat operations and to manage expectations. In other words, it is better to prepare for an insurgency that may or may not occur than to react to one that was not anticipated.
Proper interagency coordination was lacking in the planning for and conduct of the first three phases of OIF. The slow start of stability operations following the fall of Baghdad may have been minimized with interagency coordination throughout these phases of the campaign.
Without such coordination, no amount of fixes and addition of new phases will close the gap between conflict termination and conflict resolution.
A symbiotic combination of a new combat phase and proper interagency involvement are essential for successful military operations in the future. Seeking to achieve quick and decisive military victories is natural; seeking to achieve lasting national objectives is more difficult.
"Successful conflict termination, post-conflict peace operations, and conflict resolution" one analyst notes, "depend on the civil and military leadership recognizing that the end of the conflict is as critical as the conduct of war." 47 WORD COUNT=5,753 27 Ibid.
28 Flavin, 108 . For more information on war termination see, "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning," James W. Reed, Parameters, (Summer 1993) 41-52. Over ten years before OIF in the wake of the first Gulf War, Reed called for a greater emphasis on planning the post conflict operations phase of war: "Recent events…suggest that discussion of war termination should perhaps be assigned a higher priority in our thinking about strategic and operational matters."
